![]() ![]() They are instead making do with indirect fire, such as artillery and rockets, to weaken the Russian lines and then attack them with light forces. It is unlikely to be able to mount a large-scale counter-offensive, as its armed forces lack the means to undertake head-on assaults against Russian forces (particularly armoured personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles, and tanks). Ukraine will be hard pressed to defend against new Russian attacks in the first half of 2023. At that point, the overstretched Russian posture will be vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-offensives. Moscow would have to call another wave of mobilisation by the end of this winter to be able to hold expanded frontlines. Russia will therefore likely remain on the offensive until the early summer, at which point its fighting power is likely to decline again. The latter tank has lately appeared on the battlefield in increasing numbers. And, having switched to war-economy mode, the Russian tank industry is now turning out 200-250 new T-72B3 and T-90M tanks a year. It is possible that North Korean support (or North Korea passing on ammunition purchased from other countries) is part of this resilience, but no reliable information is available about such shipments. Despite predictions of ammunition shortages, Russian shelling of Ukrainian positions continues at levels relatively constant since October. While Russia is unable to backfill its expensive high-grade weapons systems with new production, it continues to produce low-end conventional systems at pace. Russian cruise missile production capacity has increased during the war despite sanctions. While Russia’s armed forces continue to struggle with numerous problems, its defence industry has proved remarkably resilient. Therefore, although further mobilisation is possible, it will likely bring only diminishing returns in terms of effectiveness on the battlefield. However, further mobilisations will come with their own difficulties: the share of men with any military experience will decrease with each wave, and the pool of officers and specialists to train, and later command, these troops will shrink quicker than it can be replenished. ![]() Russia’s defence industry has proved remarkably resilient.Īn operation from Belarus may still be feasible at a later point, especially if Moscow conducts another mobilisation. And, as Vladimir Putin is in the war for the long haul, this is unlikely to worry him unduly. This should not be underestimated, as forming new combat-ready formations from mobilised soldiers takes much longer than the Russian Ministry of Defence initially proclaimed. Instead, for the first quarter of the year, Belarus will serve as a large manoeuvre- and training-ground for Russian forces. Were Russia planning this, it would already be deploying more military units to Belarus. Additional forces totalling around 150,000-200,000 mobilised men in newly formed divisions and corps are still receiving training and will join the fight in Ukraine in the near future.ĭespite intense speculation about a renewed attack from Belarusian territory, such an undertaking is improbable, at least for the remaining winter and spring this year. The influx of additional soldiers, as poorly trained and equipped as they are, has helped the Russian military better defend its lines and resume offensive operations. In order to sustain this war of attrition and regain the initiative, Russia introduced a partial mobilisation in September 2022. From the Kremlin’s point of view, this strategy could prove successful the Russians are likely to continue with it. Russian decision-makers are relying on their information warfare and the throttling back of energy deliveries to Europe to chip away at international assistance to Ukraine. It hopes that Ukraine will eventually give up voluntarily, or that its organised military resistance will collapse. Instead of quickly conquering Ukraine from multiple directions as it had intended, Moscow is banking on a slow, grinding war in the country’s east to erode Kyiv’s resources at a rate greater than its own. Since April 2022, Russia has waged a war of attrition. But, as things stands, here is how things look for the course of the conflict. Naturally, making such predictions is always more of an art than a science. As Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine approaches the one-year mark, European publics and politicians alike are asking how long the war will last and what scenarios could play out throughout the rest of 2023. ![]()
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